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The Contagionof WomenCandidatesin
Single-MemberDistrict and Proportional
RepresentationElectoralSystems.
Canadaand Norway

RichardE. Matland
University of Houston

Donley T. Studlar
WestVirginiaUniversity
There is a distinct gap in women'srepresentationin nationallegislaturesbetween countries with
single-memberdistrictelectoralsystems and those with proportionalrepresentationelectoralsystems.
While this gap has been well documented,there havebeen only limited attemptsat explainingits existence. After reviewingthe literatureon the representationgap, we turn to the party change literature
and proposea modifiedcontagiontheoryas one possibleexplanationfor the gap. Contagiontheorysuggests that traditionalpartieswill feel pressuredto nominatemore women if one of their politicalrivals,
usuallya smallerparty fartherto the left, starts to promoterepresentationof women. We distinguish
betweenmacrocontagionand microcontagionand arguethat especiallymicrocontagionis more likelyto
occur in party list proportionalrepresentationsystems than in single-memberdistrict systems. This
shouldbe true becausecontagionpressuresaremorelikelyto develop,and the costs of adaptingto these
pressuresare less, in party list proportionalrepresentationsystems. We formallytest for microcontagion at the electoraldistrictlevel in Canadaand Norway,both leadersamongtheir type of electoralsystems in femalerepresentation.The dataconfirmour hypothesisby showingno indicationof microcontagionin Canada,but evidenceof such an effect in Norway.

INTRODUCTION

It is well established that multimemberdistrict electoral systems, especially
party list proportionalrepresentationsystems, tend to have substantiallyhigher
percentagesof women legislatorsthan single-memberdistrict systems (Duverger
1955;Lakeman1970;Castles 1981;Rule 1981; 1987;Norris 1985; 1987). In 1993,
Earlierversions of this article were presentedat the EuropeanConsortiumfor Political Research
Workshops,Madrid,April 1994, and the Midwest PoliticalScience Association,Chicago,April 1993.
RichardE. Matlandwould like to thankNATO for its supportof this researchthroughits grantprogram in DemocraticInstitutions. David Wright of the University of Houston providedvaluableresearchassistance.In addition,the contributionsof CharlesFranklin,MarkFranklin,three anonymous
reviewers,and the Gen-U-Wine OysterBarin Bastrop,Texas,are gladlyacknowledged.
Vol. 58, No. 3, August 1996,Pp. 707-33
( 1996by the University of TexasPress, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, TX 78713-7819

THE JOURNAL OF POLITICS,

708

RichardE. Matlandand Donley T. Studlar

Westerndemocracieswith partylist proportionalrepresentationsystemshad 20%
female legislators,while single-memberdistrict countries had 9% (Inter ParliamentaryUnion 1993). In Germany,where half of the membersof the Bundestag
areelectedfromeachtype of system, the multimembersystemcontributestwice as
many women as does the single-membercomponent(Lancasterand Davis 1992).
The numberof womenhas increasedwithin most systems in the wakeof "secondgeneration"feminism(Randall1987).These increaseshavebeen much morerapid,
however,in party list proportionalrepresentationsystems. The existenceof a gap
betweenthe two types of electoralsystemsis well documented.Explainingwhy the
gap occurs,however,has provento be more difficult.
This article suggests an answerto part of the puzzle by developinga theoretically based explanationof why variationsin women'srepresentationoccur across
electoralsystems. Startingfrom the literatureon politicalparty change,we investigate the phenomenonof contagionin nominatingand electing femalecandidates
to the national legislaturein two polities, Canadaand Norway. Contagion is a
process by which one party in a multiparty system, stimulates other parties to
adopttheir policiesor strategies.We will lookat contagionin termsof a party,usually a small one, that induces other parties,usuallylargerones, to nominatemore
women candidates.While contagionpressuresshould exist in both countries, we
expect the electoralsystem to play an importantrole as an interveningvariable.
Contagionis more likely to operate effectively in a proportionalrepresentation,
party list system than in a single-memberdistrict system. This helps accountfor
why proportionalrepresentationsystems have both higher proportionsof women
legislatorsand havehad fasterincreasesin the proportionof women members.
LITERATURE REVIEW

Scholarshave noted and commentedupon variationsin women'selected representationfrom manydifferentperspectives.Women'srepresentationlevels are influencedby a numberof factors.Some authorshaveemphasizedthe role of interest
groupsand social movements,particularlythe strengthof the women'smovement
(Katzensteinand Mueller 1987; Bystydzienski 1988; Gelb 1989; see, however,
Bashevkin1994).Anothercommonexplanationfor differencesin representationis
politicalculture.The Nordic countriesare all amongthe highest in proportionof
womenparliamentarians,
rangingup to 40%. This has led some observersto claim
that the political culture in these countries is more favorabletoward women
(Norris 1987;Bystydzienski1988;see, however,Matland1994).
While severalsources of variationhave been identified, there is generalagreement that electoral institutions are an important factor affecting the levels of
women's representation.Multivariatecross-nationalinvestigations have consistently shown that the electoralsystem, especiallythe differencebetween party list
proportionalrepresentationand single-memberdistrict, simple pluralitysystems,
is the most importantvariableaffecting women'sshare of legislative seats (Rule
1981; 1987;Norris 1985;1987).
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While researchershaveidentifiedthe electoralsystemas a majorinfluenceon the
numberof women who become legislators,why this should be the case has never
reallybeen settled. Severalresearcherssuggest that structuralfeaturesof the electoral system help explain the differences.In proportionalrepresentationsystems,
for example,partiesbalancetheir tickets by includingviablefemale candidateson
the partylist in orderto appealto a broadportionof the electorate.Ticket balancing
is impossible,however,in single-memberdistrictswhereonly one personcarriesthe
party banner.Others have arguedthat the largerdistrict magnitudes(numberof
seatsper district)in multimembersystemsprovidefor lowerthresholdsfor women
to cross when seeking nominations(Engstrom 1987; Rule 1987; Matland 1993).
Anotherstructuralfactoris the relativelycentralizednominationproceduresthat
usuallyapplyin partylist systems(Castles 1981;Gallagherand Marsh 1988).Centralizedcontrol over nominationsmeans that party elites can increasethe number
of viable women candidatesin response to pressure for greater representation.
Most single-memberdistrictsystemstend to havedecentralizednominationstructures;becauseof this centralpartyorganswantingto increasewomen'srepresentation have considerabledifficultiesin getting their wishes carriedout at the local
level (Norris 1993).Finally,the decreasedemphasison individualincumbencyand
greaterturnovercharacteristicof proportionalrepresentation(PR) systems result
in greateropportunitiesfor women in such systems (Matlandand Studlar 1995).
Severalauthorshave noted the absolutedifferencein femalerepresentationbetween single-memberdistrict and multimemberdistrict proportionalrepresentation systems. As table 1 and figure 1 show, however,there are also significantdifferences in developmentsover time.' As is immediatelyobvious from figure 1,
representationlevels have grownmuch more quicklyin PR systemsthan in singlememberdistrict systems. While a moderategap existed between the two systems
from post-WorldWarII until 1970,after 1970there is a substantialand significant
increasein the gap. Femalerepresentationjumpedin the PR countriesfrom 6.0%
in 1970 to 20.2% in 1993. A much smallerincreasein women'srepresentationoccurred in the single-memberdistrict countries as representationcrept up from
2.2% to 9.5%. The increasesamong the PR system countries were also broad.
Womenincreasedtheirrepresentationby morethan 10%in 11 of the 16 PR system
countriesthat had open elections in both 1970 and 1993. Women increasedtheir
representationby more than 10% in only two of the seven single-memberdistrict
countries. Students of women'srepresentationin single-memberdistrict systems
haveprojectedthe increaseof women in the legislaturewill continueat a very slow
pace until the middle of the twenty-firstcentury (Andersen and Thorson 1984;
Darcy and Choike 1986;Norris, Vallance,and Lovenduski1992).
Thus, despite similarsocial pressuressince the mid-1960s to increasewomen's
legislativerepresentationin all Westerndemocracies,the successof these demands
I We use the 23 countriesRule uses in her 1987 cross-nationalstudy of women's
representation.We
also use her definitions of single member and PR systems. Updated data are supplied by the Inter
ParliamentaryUnion (1993).
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TABLE 1
PERCENTOF MPS WHO WEREWOMEN

1945-1993
ACROSS
23 NATIONALLEGISLATURES,
System/
Year

1945

1950

1960

1970

1980

1990

1993

SMD
PR

3.05
3.16

2.13
5.05

2.51
5.86

2.23
6.03

3.37
11.79

8.16
18.43

9.47
20.16

Definitions:
Single-memberdistrictsystems (SMD): Australia,Canada,France(1960 and beyond),Japan',New
Zealand,United Kingdom,and United States.
ProportionalRepresentationSystems (PR): Austria,Belgium, Denmark,Finland, France(1945 and
1950), Greece*, Iceland, Ireland, Israel", Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal*, Spain*, Sweden,
Switzerland,and West Germany"*.
' Technically,Japandoes not havea single-memberdistrictsystem. The Japaneseelectoralsystem at
this time was Single NontransferableVotesystem and formallythis is a PR system.The way the system
functionsin practice,however,with eachvoterhavingonly one vote, is generallyconsideredby electoral
system expertsto be closerto a single memberdistrictsystem thana traditionalproportionalrepresentation system (Rule 1987,personalconversation,RichardKatz).
* Greece,Portugal,and Spainbecamedemocraticin the 1970sand arethereforeonly includedin the
1980, 1990,and 1993figures.
** Israeldid not exist and West Germanydid not hold elections in 1945. They are thereforenot included in 1945.They are includedfor all yearsfollowing 1945.

has varied considerably.As figure 1 makes clear, these demandshave been more
successfullytranslatedinto representationin parliamentsin proportionalrepresentationsystemsthanin single-memberdistrictsystems.While therehavebeen similar systemicdemandsacrosscountries,becausedifferentinstitutionsprocessthese
demands,they lead to differentresults (Chamberlin1990). Our goal is to provide
an explanationfor why PR systemshavebeen moreopen to demandsfor representation by women, especiallyduringthe past 20 years.The model we presentsuggests both the dynamicsof party competition and the natureof electoralinstitutions are importantfactorsin increasesin femalerepresentation.
THEORETICAL
MODEL

Contagionis not a new concept in the parties literature.Duverger (1954) first
suggested that a "contagionfrom the left" would occur among political parties,
with Conservativeand Liberalcadrepartiesbeing forced to emulatethe Socialist
partiesby developinginto massmembershippartiesor else face the dangerof electoraldefeat.Epstein(1967) respondedwith the idea of "contagionfrom the right,"
wherebyleftist partieswouldbe forcedto adaptto the use of moderncampaigning
techniquessuch as publicopinionsurveysand mass mediaadvertising,firstdeveloped by partieson the right. Kirchheimer(1966) saw a movementamong parties
away from their distinctive forms and ideologies and towardmuch broaderand
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shallowerentities that he describedas catch-allparties.The need to replicatesuccessfulelectoralstrategiesdevelopedby one'scompetitors,in orderto remaincompetitive, would drive these processesof imitation.
The degreeto which these variouscontagionshavespreadacrossindividualparties is a question of some controversy.While there is evidence that parties have
adoptedsimilarpolicies in some areas(Krouwel 1994), parties have also retained
distinctiveelements.More recenttheorizingon individualpartychangehas tended
to emphasizethe conservativenatureof organizationsand the generalopposition
within an organizationto change(Panebianco1988;HarmelandJanda1994). It is
not that partiesdo not change,only that changeis often a difficultprocessrequiring considerableeffort.To move in a specificdirectionin reactionto some external
event requiresagreementon the interpretationof the externalevent or shock, a
willingnessby the dominantcoalitionwithinthe partyto supporta change,and the
resourcesto implementthe agreed-uponchange.Often one or more of these elements are missing.
While our primaryemphasisis on establishingan explanationfor the differences
across electoral systems in women's representation,we also believe light can be
shed on the generalquestion of party adaptationby lookingat one specific party
decision across systems. We will look at the decision to increasethe number of
women nominatedfor the centrallegislatureand whetherwe can discerna contagion effect on this elementof party activity.
Our versionof contagiontheorysuggeststhatas smallerbut competitiveparties,
usuallyon the politicalfringe, startto promotewomen actively,largerpartieswill
move to emulatethem. This shouldhappenfor at leasttwo reasons.First, by nominating women, smallerparties may demonstratethat there is no electoralpenalty
associated with women candidates.Although it was a common excuse for not
nominatingwomen in earlieryears (Ranney 1965;Bochel and Denver 1983), researchhas repeatedlyshown this fearof publicantipathytowardwomencandidates
is almost completely groundlessin Westerndemocraciesin the 1970s and 1980s
(Darcy and Schramm 1977; Rasmussen 1983; Hunter and Denton 1984; Kelley
and McAllister 1984;Welchand Studlar 1986). Second, largerpartieswill feel increasedpressureto respondby more actively promotingwomen themselves.This
will be especiallytrue for partieswhich areideologicallyclose to the partiesinitiating promotionof women candidates.These partieswould fearlosing votersto the
innovatingparty.Overtime, as eachpartyreactsto a felt threatfrom close political
rivals on the issue of equity in representation,the perceived need to nominate
womenwill flow acrossthe politicalsystemto virtuallyall parties.The expectation
is that all the mainstreamparties will eventually start nominating appreciable
numbersof women candidatesto demonstratetheir commitmentto equal rights.
Since this process is driven by party competition we expect contagionto exist in
both single-memberand PR systems. We expect, however, that the process will be
more effective in bringing women into office and spread more quickly in multimember
proportionalrepresentationsystems.
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There are three reasonswhy this process should be more effective in PR systems. First, single-memberdistrict systems tend to be two party systems; they
often lackthe stimulus of a minorparty innovatingon the issue of women'snominations. Unless pushed on the issue of representation,the dominant coalition
within a party may see little need to disrupt existing routines to promote more
womenas candidates.When no viablethird partyexists, womenactivistsand their
supportershave to argue for better representationlargelyon equity grounds. If
there is an active third party, however, the faction within the party promoting
women candidatescan bolsterthe equity argumentwith a strategicargumentthat
the party is in dangerof losing votes unless it responds. As a generalpoint, the
greaternumberof parties in proportionalrepresentationsystems providesan increasedprobabilitythat one party will decide actively to promote women candidates and set the contagion process in motion. A party's need to find issues on
which it can take strong stands in order to attractsupportersalso increasesthis
likelihood.2

The second reasoncontagionshould be more commonin PR systemsis that the
politicalcosts of respondingto this challengearesmaller.It is easierfor a majorpolitical party to respond in a PR system than in a single-memberdistrict system.
This is especiallytrue wheredistrictmagnitude,the numberof seatsper district,is
large. Under these conditions, ticket balancingis substantiallyeasier because a
majorparty can expect to win severalseats in each district.It is thereforepossible
for the party to nominatewomen without havingto depose more powerfulintraparty interests.In the single-memberdistrict, however,respondingto the thirdparty challengemay requiredeposingan incumbentor challenginga centralparty
interest.Under these conditions,even if the party wantedto respond,it might decide that it is better to ignore the externalchallengefrom the third party than to
riskcreatinginternalstrife and antagonizingpowerfulintrapartyinterests.3
The third reason for contagion'sexpected greatereffectiveness in PR systems
is that the threat of losing votes is more serious and therefore more worthy of
a counterreactionin a PR system than in single-memberdistrict systems. The
differencesin the costs of losing votes in the two systems create this effect. In a
2Recent workon party-voterinteractions,done underthe rubricof directionaltheory,has found that
voterstend to evaluatemost positivelythose partiesthat takethe strongeststandson an issue important
to voters and not necessarilythe party which may be closest to their own position in issue space
(MacDonald,Listhaug, and Rabinowitz1991;Rabinowitz,MacDonald,and Listhaug 1991). The implicationof this researchfor partystrategistsis clear,a partyshould takeaggressivestandson the issues
of importanceto its constituents.
'The organizationaltheory literaturehas been interestedin the question of inertiaand ability to respond to environmentalchangesfor quite some time. Marchand Simon (1958) were amongthe first to
point out that internalconstraintson actions are often sufficientto lead to inactioneven when external
threatsare clearlyrecognized.Hannanand Freeman(1977, 1984, 1989)havearguedthat such inertiais
extremely common and that organizationsare often unable to adapt when such adaptationpresents
significantshort-termcosts to centralorganizationactors,even when there is a clearlong-term payoff
for the organization.
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single-member district system, a party's overwhelming concern is finishing first.
The margin of victory is a smaller concern. Therefore actions by a minor party that
threaten to siphon off some votes, perhaps even a substantial number of votes, but
do not threaten the dominant party's position as number one in the district, can be
safely ignored. In effect, in safe districts we would not expect to see the dominant
party pay great attention to minor party actions. Compare this with the situation in
proportional representation systems with large district magnitudes. Even minor
shifts in the major party's vote total can affect their total number of seats.
Therefore, even when a party is dominant in the district, it must take very seriously the danger of losing a few percentage points off its vote. The costs of failing
to react will not merely be the symbolic cost of a smaller victory margin, but the
very real cost of fewer seats in parliament.
Contagion theory suggests that the contours of the party system, as well as the
electoral system, are of critical importance for the advancement of women's legislative numbers. Quite often the smaller parties that set the process in motion elect
very few representatives and do not noticeably contribute to the increased number
of women in the parliament. When the larger parties react to their example by
nominating women to viable seats, however, substantial increases in representation
occur. Since we predict major party reaction is more likely to occur in proportional
representation systems, there should be a significant difference across the two systems in female representation.
One final theoretical distinction concerning contagion needs to be made. We
distinguish between macrocontagion and microcontagion. Macrocontagion occurs
at the national or central level. Microcontagion occurs at the local or electoral district level. Macrocontagion is a process where a party responds to general political
pressure from competing parties on the issue of representation by increasing its
promotion of women across constituencies, but not necessarily in the same districts as where other parties nominate women. It is sufficient for the party to be
able to show that it is willing to nominate women, with at least some of them in
competitive districts. Macrocontagion should have the general effect of raising levels of women's representation across all districts. This is likely to influence virtually all parties, although with different intensities. Microcontagion is district specific and occurs when a party's constituency candidate selection meeting decides to
increase the number of women in electable positions, as a response to the nomination of women in prominent positions by its competitors within the district.
Microcontagion is a response at the local district level to pressure generated at the
local level.
Micro- and macrocontagion are independent processes, but they are generally
complementary. For example, if microcontagion occurs in individual districts, it
may increase the pressure at the national level to adopt more general rules of equal
representation. The distinctions between the two processes are important for several reasons. One is that they predict different patterns of diffusion of women candidates. While macrocontagion predicts a general rise in the number of women candidates throughout all constituencies in the country, microcontagion predicts that
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womencandidateswill be clustereddisproportionatelyin those districtswherethe
innovatingpartiespromotingwomenhavenominatedwomenat a prominentlevel.
A secondimportantreasonfor distinguishingbetweenthese processesis thatwe believe macrocontagionis likelyto occurin all systems,while microcontagionis more
likelyto appearin PR systems.Finally,distinguishingbetweenthe two types helps
sharpenour perspectiveson how to test empiricallyfor contagionof both varieties.
We knowof no explicit attemptsat testing for macrocontagion.In severalsingle
countrycase studies,however,thereis substantialanecdotalevidencethat suggests
thatminorpartiesareoften the innovatorsin nominatinglargenumbersof women
for parliamentaryseats.4In countries as diverse as Canada,Norway, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Italy,New Zealand,and France,smallerparties, especially
those on the left, have led the way (Aitken 1980; Vallance 1984; Brodie 1985;
Bystydzienski1988; Beckwith 1990; Kolinsky 1991; Bashevkin1993; Norris and
Lovenduski1993). In the analysisbelow, we presenta descriptionof the development of women'scandidaciesin Norwayand Canadain an attemptto gaugemacrocontagion'srelevancein these countries.
The only formaltest of the microcontagionhypothesisexaminedlocal elections
in England,a single-memberdistrict system with an emerging third party challenger havingpolicies favorabletowardwomen (Studlarand Welch 1992). In the
mid-1980s the Alliance, an electoralpact between the Liberaland Social Democratic parties, challenged the two-party dominance of the Conservatives and
Labour.The Alliancehad strongwomen'sadvocacypositions,includinga requirement that womenbe placedon the shortlist for parliamentarycandidacies.The results for the 1986 English Metropolitandistrict elections show weak support for
the contagionhypothesis. Controllingfor other variables,Labourwas somewhat
more willing to run women candidatesin three-partyratherthan two-partycontests. After the discussionof macrocontagionwe will turn to microcontagionand
presentformaltests of microcontagionin both Canadaand Norway.
THE NORWEGIAN
ANDCANADIAN
CASES
MACROCONTAGION:

electionsin Norwayand Canadafor a moresystematictest
We use parliamentary
of the contagionhypothesis.Both areleadersin women'slegislativerepresentation
among countrieswith their particularelectoralarrangements.Norway,with 39%
women legislatorsafter the 1993 election, is second amongparty list proportional
representationcountries (after Sweden). Canada, with 18% women legislators
after the 1993 election, is second among single-memberdistrictcountriesto New
Zealand,with 21%.5 Both have multipartysystems. In Norwayeight partieshave
seats in the Storting after the 1993 election-Red ElectoralAlliance, Socialist
4Contagion from minorto majorpartieshas also been found to affectan arenafar from women'srepresentation,namelygovernmentspending.See Petry(1988) and Hofferbertand Budge (1992).
51n 1994, New Zealandvoted by referendumto alter its electoralsystem to a mixed (German-type)
system. The sitting Parliament,however,was elected in November1993using a single-memberdistrict
system.
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Left, Labour,Liberals,CenterParty,ChristianDemocrats,Conservatives,and the
ProgressParty.Before the 1993 elections, the previousquartercenturyin Canada
had seen three-party competition for national office between the Progressive
Conservatives,Liberals,and New Democrats.In the 1993elections two insurgent
parties,the Bloc Quebecoisand the Reformparty,madesignificantinroadsinto the
House of Commons, while the Conservativesand NDP sufferedsubstantialsetbacks. Five parties are thereforerepresentedin the present House of Commons.
Representation
of Womenin Norway
The rise of women to legislative power in Norway has been well documented
(Means 1972, 1973;Haavio-Mannilaet al. 1985;Bystydzienski1988, 1994;Matland
1993, 1995).From a low point in the 1960s,womenhaveorganizedthemselvesand
politicalpartiesacrossthe spectrumhaverespondedsufficientlyto makeNorwaya
world leaderin female elite representation,not only in the legislaturebut also in
the Cabinet,where47% of the ministersarewomen.The femaleprimeministerof
Norway,Gro HarlemBrundtland,has been the leaderof the largestparty,Labour,
for 15 years. Three of the six majorparty leaders during the last parliamentary
election (for the Labour, Conservative,and Center parties) were women. While
Norway'sposition as a world leaderis well established,there is still a debateabout
the relativeimportanceof variousfactorsin the rise of women-electoral system,
social movementorganizations,party nominationprocedures,districtmagnitude,
and politicalculture.
The firstmovementsto promoteimprovedrepresentationof women in Norway
occurredin the 1960s.There wereactive campaignsbeforethe 1967and 1971local
electionsand beforethe 1969nationalelectionsto increasewomen'srepresentation
on partylists (Bystydzienski1988).These initialmovementswerecross-partypromotional campaignswhere prominentparty leadersfrom severalparties, in unison, urged all parties to increasetheir representationof women. No party clearly
steppedforwardas most concernedwith representation,althoughmost partiesexhibited some willingnessto incorporatemore women. Interestingly,in discussing
party nominatingprocedures,Valen(1966) describesa processthat fits the contagion model quite well. He suggeststhat in localelectionsmanypartylists had previouslyonly includedmen amongthose who hada viablechanceof getting elected.
Once one party declaredan intention to nominatea woman in a viable position,
however, all parties would rush to nominate a woman in a viable position. The
willingnessto supportwomen, however,was often limitedto tokenrepresentation.
There was an interest in having a single woman on the list in an electableposition, but true equality was not seriously considered(Means 1973; Christiansen
1979; Matland 1993). Nevertheless, the proportionof women in the Norwegian
Storting increasedfrom 6.7% to 15.5%from 1957to 1973.
The 1970s broughtimprovedaccess as women'srepresentationin the Storting
jumped 10%, from 15.5% in 1973 to 25.8% in 1981. The mid to late 1970s
also saw significantdifferencesin willingnessto incorporatedemandsfor greater
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representation.Cross-partymovementsfaded;the emphasiswas on internalparty
pressures.Energizedby its active oppositionto the EEC referendumin 1972, the
SocialistLeft scoredits best electionever in the 1973nationalelections,increasing
its representationfrom zero to 16 members(of 155 total members).The Socialist
Left adopted numerous feminist planks in their party programthroughoutthe
1970s and became identified increasinglywith this position. The Socialist Left
made a crucial decision in 1977 when they establishedquotas. Starting with the
1977elections, 50%of all SocialistLeft candidateswereto be women.The Liberal
party, Norway's oldest political party, had split over the issue of joining the
Common Marketand was virtuallydecimatedin the 1973 elections. In the years
leadingup to the next parliamentaryelection,they developeda politicalprofilethat
emphasized green politics, but also included important elements of women's
rights. A woman, Eva Kolstad, was elected party leader in 1974. In 1977, the
Liberalspasseda resolutionthatat least40% of its parliamentarycandidateswould
be women (Grepstadand Nerb0vik 1984). The issue of equal representationwas
also activelyconsideredin the other partiesand pressurewas appliedin these parties. While this led to some increasein representation,no formalpolicies were approvedto bolsterwomen'spositions.
The 1980s saw anotherjump of 10% in overallwomen'slegislativerepresentation, from 25.8% in 1981 to 35.8% in 1989. The most crucialaction in the 1980s
was the Labourparty'sdecision in 1983 to establishquotas.Once established,and
honored,quotas in a proportionalrepresentationsystem virtually guaranteethat
representationwill improve.The quotashad an immediateand clearimpacton the
Labourdelegationas it went from33% femalein 1981to 51%femalein 1989.This
increasedpressureon the other partiesto increasetheir femalerepresentation.All
parties,except the Progressparty,did so in the 1980s.At the end of the decadethe
Centerpartybecamethe fourthparty to establishformalgenderquotasfor candidates. After the 1993 elections the proportion of the Norwegian Members of
Parliamentwho were womenreached39%.
The developmentof femalerepresentationin Norwaycan be partiallydescribed
as an exampleof macrocontagion.The nationalLabourparty'srecognitionof the
pressurefrom the SocialistLeft and the Liberalsto nominatewomen, and the initial urging from the centraloffices to their local nominatingcaucusesto consider
more women, is an exampleof macrocontagion.The decisionby the nationalconvention in 1983 to adopt quotas is also an example of macrocontagion.While
macrocontagionprocessesareimportant,we believethatmicrocontagionprocesses
also play an importantrole in the generaladvanceof women in Norway.We will
test for microcontagionby seeing whetherLabourtended to providewomen with
better opportunitiesin those districtswhere the SocialistLeft or the Liberalshad
nominatedwomen. First, however,let us turn to macrocontagionin Canada.
of Womenin Canada
Representation
The Canadianstoryof women'srepresentationis not as well known,perhapsbecause until the parliamentaryelection of 1984 Canadawas a laggardin this area.
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With a doublingof women'snumbersin the House of Commonsin 1984,from 5 to
10%, however,and furtherincreasesto 13% in 1988 and to 18% in 1993, Canada
becamea leaderamong single-memberdistrict countries.In comparison,despite
noticeableincreasesafter the 1992 elections, both the United Kingdom (9%) and
the United States(11%)still arewell behindCanadain proportionof femalemembers of the most popularlyelected house. There have been several hypotheses
offered for the rise of women in Canada,including unexpected election results
in 1984 vaulting presumed"sacrificiallambs"into office, pressurefrom feminist
organizations,party nominationprocedures,and high legislative turnover rates
(Brodie 1985;Brodie and Chandler1991;Erickson1991;Young 1991;Bashevkin
1993;Studlarand Matland1994).
As in Norway,all parties have made some moves towardenhancingaccess for
women. The partymost aggressivelypushingfor a greatershareof politicalpower
for women has been the socialistparty,the New Democrats. Since the 1970s the
federalNew Democrats,traditionallythe third party in terms of votes and legislative seats in the CanadianfederalHouse of Commons,have specificallyorganized
to target electoralappealsat women (Gotell and Brodie 1991). In the 1980s the
NDP adoptedaffirmativeaction methodsin pursuitof its feministagenda.For instance, in 1981 and 1983 the federalNDP passed affirmativeaction resolutions
aimedat genderparitywithin the ranksof the partyorganizationand ranseminars
specificallyaimedat recruitingand trainingwomen candidates(Gotell and Brodie
1991; Erickson 1993). The two other parties have followed the NDP, albeit less
vigorously,in advocatinga more participatoryrole for women in partisanpolitics.
Erickson(1993) notes, the NDP has tended to be first,most interventionist,and
most centralizedin programsto improve women's status within the party. The
Liberalshavetendedto follow,be less interventionist,and rely more on localparty
cooperation,while the Conservativeshave been the most reluctantto advocate
specialinitiatives for women, most voluntaristicin implementation,and most reliant on local branchesof the party. The New Democrats became the first significantparty in Canadato have a federal-levelwomanparty leaderwhen Audrey
McLaughlin was chosen in 1989. Although all parties now have larger numbers of women holding party positions, the New Democrats continue to lead
(Bashevkin1993).
On the provinciallevel, the New Democrats have been the leader in placing
large numbersof women into legislaturesand cabinets, especiallyin elections in
1990 and 1991 in Ontario, Saskatchewan,and British Columbia (Studlar and
Matland 1996; Studlar and Moncrief 1995). While eschewing quotas, the other
parties have encouragedgreaterparticipationby women in their ranks,including
provinciallegislaturesand cabinets.All-male cabinetsno longer exist in Canada.
Two women have served as provincial premiers, and several others have been
provincialparty leaders.
In federalelections, the New Democratshave nominatedthe most women candidates,providingalmostone half of the femalecandidatesfor the threetraditional
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parties over the six federalelections between 1974 and 1993. Nevertheless, their
third-placefinishesoverallhavepreventedthem fromputting manyof these candidatesinto parliament.Thus the two largerparties,the Liberalsand the Progressive
Conservatives,have providedthe bulk of women M.P.s. With a volatileelectorate
in Canada(LeDuc 1984;Clarkeet al. 1991), however,the New Democrats'strong
espousalof women'scauses seems to have stimulatedthe other parties to respond
(Gotell and Brodie 1991). Both of the largerpartiesbegan to professa concernin
increasingwomen candidaciesas the issue becamemore prominent.For instance,
before the election of 1984 the New Democratsand the Liberalscreatedspecial
funds to aid in the election of their women candidates;the ProgressiveConservatives followedsoon after the election (Erickson1993).
Canadain 1991, then under a single-partyProgressiveConservativegovernment, had 18% women in its Cabinet(Koole and Mair 1992), including the only
female foreign minister in the industrializedworld. In 1993 Kim Campbell,formerly Defense Minister and Justice Minister in Brian Mulroney'scabinets,succeeded the retiring ConservativePrime Minister. Thus, two of the three major
partyleadersin the federalelection of 1993were women.At theirpartyconference
in 1991, the New Democratsannounceda goal of having 50% female candidates
for Parliamentin the next federalelection, a very ambitiousgoal for a party in a
single-memberdistrictsystem with decentralizedcandidateselection processes.In
fact, 38% of the NDP candidatesin 1993 were women. LiberalParty leaderJean
Chretien invoked his extraordinarypower to approvefederalparliamentarycandidates primarilyto increasethe number of Liberal women in winnableseats in
1993. The Liberal goal was 25% women candidates;they finished at 21%. The
Conservativeparty slate included women as 22% of their federalcandidates.Although the rising new parties, the Bloc Quebecoisand the Reform Party,nominated fewer women (13% and 11%, respectively),Canadastill had a historically
high 18% women in the House of Commonsafter the election. Events in Canada
suggest that in a volatile party system, the New Democrats acted as a force for
macrocontagionamongother parties,both old and new.
Thus we have two polities with contrastingelectoral systems, but both with
multipartysystems and with similarlystrong trends in advancingwomen to legislative and executive positions. In both systems, it appears that a process of
macrocontagionhas occurredby which parties, starting with those on the Left,
have increasinglyforwardedwomen candidates.While the idea of a generaltrend
towardnominatingmore women via a macrocontagionprocess has face validity,
contagiontheorywill be considerablystrengthenedif we can also find microcontagion occurring.It is to that taskwe now turn.
TestingMicrocontagion
Microcontagionoccurs when a party responds to the nomination of women
candidatesby anotherparty by nominatingits own women candidatesin viable
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positions in the sameconstituencies.
We expect a majorparty which competes directlywith a minorpartythatis promotingwomen,to be most acutelypressuredto
respond.Since the partiespromotingwomen candidatesand issues are on the left
side of the political spectrumin the two cases we are lookingat, we theorizethat
contagionshouldaffectthe Labourpartyin Norway,i.e., the majorpartyclosest to
the Socialist Left and Liberals, and the Liberal party in Canada,i.e., the major
partyclosest to the NDP.6
Our expectationsare that microcontagiondoes not work the same in these two
countries.We would expect microcontagionto be more evident in Norwaythan in
Canada.This is true becausethe party list system and greaterdistrict magnitude
found in Norway makes it easier for the NorwegianLabourparty to respond to
contagionpressure.A party list system with a high districtmagnitude,as Norway
has, allowsa partyto adjustby addinga woman(or women)to the list withouthaving to pay the high cost of confrontingother centralparty interests.In a singlememberdistrict system the party may have to remove a sitting M.P. or shut out
strong intrapartyinterestsin orderto run a woman.We believe that this cost will
provetoo high and that microcontagioneffectswill not be found in Canada.
Before asserting that not finding microcontagionis a foregone conclusion in
Canada,let us point out several reasons why microcontagionis more likely to
be found in Canadathan in other single-memberdistrict systems. First, singlememberdistrictsystems arelikely to havefewerpartiesand thereforeless likely to
have a party actively promoting women'srights. In choosing Canada,a country
with more thantwo partiesand one stronglypromotingwomen, we pass these barriers. Second, the viabilityof the threatis often an importantstumblingblock for
contagionin single-memberdistrict systems. If a party'sposition is so strong in a
district that they face no seriouselectoralchallenge,then they may simply ignore
the innovatingparty's actions and no contagionwill occur. Again, Canadais an
outlieron the side favorableto contagion.First, while the NDP was clearlya third
party,it was well established.The NDP garneredclose to 20% of the vote in the
three federalelections held in the 1980sand was consideredan importantactorby
the other parties. Second, the Canadianelectoratehas proven to be extremely
volatile. Massive movements have often occurredfrom one election to the next.
This effectivelymeansthat in Canadano seat can be consideredentirelysafe. The
two majorpartiescannotignorethird partychallenges.7
6It is clear that Labour,the Socialist Left, and the Liberalscompete for the same voters. Valenand
Aardal(1983), using a panel study, found that among those voters who voted for the Socialist Left in
1977, but for someone else in 1981, 75% went to Labour. Among those who switched away from
Labour,45% went either to the SocialistLeft or the Liberals.
7The 1993 election proved this point in a stunning manner.The Bloc Quebecoisand the Reform
Parties,who togetherheld ten seats in the outgoingparliament,went on to win over 100 seats between
them and completelydecimatedthe Conservativeparty which fell from a majorityof the seats in the
295 memberHouse of Commonsto only 2 seats.
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TestingMicrocontagion
in Canada.In the Canadiancase the majorpartymost affectedby the minorparty(NDP) promotionof womenshouldbe the Liberals.The
microcontagionhypothesisis that the Liberalparty will nominatemore women in
ridings(in Canada,a constituencyis calleda riding)wherethe NDP has nominated
a woman, than in ridings where the NDP has nominateda man. The dependent
variableis the same for both countries:the proportionof the district delegation
that is femalefor the majorparty closest to the minorparty promotingwomen. In
Canadaall districts are single-memberdistricts, so the dependent variablemeasureswhetherthe Liberalpartycandidateis a woman.If the candidateis a man the
dependentvariableis 0; if the candidateis a woman the dependentvariableis 1.
Probitanalysisis the obviousmethodologicaltool to use. Probitanalyseswere run
for the 1980, 1984, and 1988 elections. This period was chosen becauseit was the
period in which a substantialincreasein women'srepresentationoccurred. The
number of cases in our initial analysisis equal to the number of constituencies.
There were 282 ridingsin 1980and 1984and 295 ridingsin 1988.
The crucial independentvariable,measuringcontagion, is whether the NDP
nomineein the districtis a man or a woman.This variableis coded 1 if the nominee is a woman,0 if a man. In additionto our primaryvariableof interest,the probits include a set of independentvariablesto control for district characteristics.
Moncriefand Thompson (1991) found that urbandistrictsin Canadatend to nominate more women than ruraldistricts.Other work has refinedthis and identified
women'slaborforce participationratesand levels of educationin a districtas importantfactorsthat affect female representationin Canada(Studlarand Matland
1994).In addition,whetherthe candidateis an incumbenthas been shown to have
a significantnegativeeffect on the probabilitya candidatewill be a woman.
The Canadianresults are presented in table 2. We ran two different models.
Model one tests for contagionin the sameyear,model two tests for contagionfrom
the previouselection. The second model, that contagionoccurs from the previous
election, was tested due to concernthatit might takethe Liberalpartyone election
cycle before being able to react to the NDP's nominationof a woman. General
party meetings held in each riding nominatethe candidates.If the Liberalsheld
their nominationmeetings prior to the NDP's, they might not be able to react to
the NDP's nominationof a womanin the same election.While this is of some concern, it is also true that even if the Liberalsheld their ridingnominationmeetings
beforethe NDP's, often they wouldknowwhom the NDP expectedto nominatein
a riding and whetherthat personwas a woman.Nevertheless,to give microcontagion anotheropportunityto appearwe tested Model Two.
The control variablesgenerallyhave the expected sign, and in all cases where
they aresignificantthey workin the mannerpredictedby theory.The independent
variabletesting for microcontagionshows no indicationthat contagionhas had an
affect on the Liberal party's propensity to nominate women. The effect is nonsignificantfor all six probitsand the sign is in the predicteddirectionfor only two
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TABLE2
PROBITRESULTSFORCANADA1980, 1984, and1988

Constant
1980
Model 1
Model 2
1984
Model 1
Model 2
1988
Model 1
Model 2

Incumbent
Candidate

% of Pop.
Women's Contagion
w/ Univ. LaborForce from Same
Year
Education Part.Rate

-2.64**
(.91)

-.39
(.26)

-.03
(.02)

.04*
(.02)

-.52
(.46)

-2.64**
(.90)

-.36
(.26)

-.03
(.02)

.04*
(.02)

X

-.35
(.77)

-.81**
(.23)

.00
(.02)

-.01
(.02)

.28
(.22)

-.29
(.76)

-.82**
(.23)

.01
(.02)

-.01
(.02)

X

-1.41
(.79)

-.38
(.35)

.03*
(.01)

.00
(.02)

-.01
(.19)

-1.36
(1.00)

-.14
(.39)

.04**
(.01)

-.00
(.02)

X

Contagion
from Past
Election
X
-.29
(.36)
X
-.00
(.30)
X
.10
(.24)

Dependent Variable= Genderof LiberalPartyCandidate(Woman 1)
* Significantat the .05 level, one-tailedtest.
** Significantat the .01 level, one-tailedtest.
N = 282 for 1980and 1984.
N = 295 for 1988.

of the six probits.These dataare consistentwith our predictionand do not show
any microcontagioneffect occurringin Canada.8
While the initial results show little indication of any microcontagioneffect
acrossthe country,the regionalnatureof partycompetitionin Canadamight mean
that a true contagioneffect could be maskedby a set of districtswherethe Liberals
8Whilewe arguethat contagionshould occur to the party closest to the innovator,it is possiblethat
the innovationmight be pickedup by other parties.We tested the two models presentedin table2 using
the gender of the ProgressiveConservativeparty nominee as the dependent variable.When testing
model 1 we found that for all three elections, the effect of the NDP nominatinga womanon the probabilitythat the PC nominateda womanwas non-significant,and in two of the three cases the effect had
the wrong sign, i.e., negative. Testing model 2, that the effect of contagionis lagged, producedsome
surprisingresults. The effect was nonsignificantin 1980, it was statisticallysignificantand positive in
1984 (as predictedby the theory),and finallyit was statisticallysignificantand negative in 1988. While
the 1984resultsprovidesone strawof evidencein favorof contagion,the validityof that effect must be
seriouslyquestionedwhen the oppositeeffect appearsin the very next election along with all the nonsignificantresults reported for the other tests. In addition, further analysisshows that this result is
largelydriven by a strong correlationin Quebec ridings,between femaleNDP nomineesin 1980, and
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and NDP were not effective competitors.Therefore we redid the analyseswith
only ridings where both the NDP and the Liberalparty had at least 20% of the
vote. The NDP or the Liberalswon the majorityof the ridingsincludedin the second test. In those cases where the PC did win, it is reasonableto assumethat the
significantvote total for the third placefinisher(i.e., eitherLiberalor NDP) is one
reason that the PC won the seat. In other words, all these districts are districts
wherethe Liberalsand NDP are competitive.
There were 94 districts(33.3% of all districts)which met or exceed this 20/20
standardin 1980; 64 districts (22.7% of all districts) were above the standardin
1984; and 89 (30.2% of all districts)met it in 1988.9We retestedboth contagion
models for this subset of ridingsfor the three elections. Againthere were no signs
of microcontagionoccurring.The microcontagionvariablewas insignificantin all
six tests, and in only one case was the t-statisticabove 1.00.
TestingMicrocontagion
in Norway. In applying microcontagionto Norway,we
concentrateon the Labourparty.Labourhas been the largestand most powerful
politicalparty in Norwaythroughoutthe post WorldWarII period. Being on the
left side of the politicalspectrum,Labouris the majorpartymost likely to be sensitive to pro-womenmovementsby the Socialist Left and the increasinglygreen
Liberals. The expectation is that after the Socialist Left and the Liberal party
began aggressivelypromotingwomen, the Labourparty would start to feel pressured to do likewise. We expect this pressureto be most acute for local Labour
party caucusesin those districtswherethe SocialistLeft and/or the Liberalshave
nominatedwomenprominentlyon theirparty lists.
For microcontagionto occur there must be a party (or parties)explicitly identified as promotingthe issue of women'srepresentation.This effectivelyprecludes
considerationof the elections before 1973, since the earliest campaignsfor improved representationwere across all parties. Continued discussion of the EEC
referendumof the previousyear completelydominatedthe 1973 elections. While
there was pressurefor increasedrepresentation,no party made the issue a centerpiece of their campaign.This changedradically,however,by 1977 when both the
SocialistLeft and the Liberalsprominentlyfeaturedtheir commitmentto gender
equality.Both parties establishedquotas for women candidates,and the female
proportionof their party lists jumpeddramaticallyfrom 26.2% in 1973 to 43.8%
in 1977. Importantly,both parties were electoralthreatsto the Labourparty.We
thereforeexpectto see microcontagionplaya rolein 1977and in the followingelection in 1981. In 1983, the Labourparty instituted gender quotas.This party rule
femalePC nomineesin 1984. The NDP is extremelyweakin Quebec, and until the 1984 elections so
were the PC. It seems unlikelythat the PC saw the NDP as an importantthreatto theirelectoralsuccess
in Quebecand thereforenominatedmore women to lure votersawayfrom the NDP.
9More than 50% of these districtswere in Ontario,with British Columbiabeing the next most common province.The rest of the ridings are largelyin urbanareasin the other provinces.Note the 1984
numberis substantiallylowerthan 1980or 1988,becauseof the PC landslidein that year.
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led to Labourquicklyadoptinga system of (near)equalityacrossthe country.By
this time, macrocontagionhadsucceededin getting the Labourpartyto alterits institutions, and we would not expect to see any effect of microcontagionin 1985 or
1989. This leaves us with a window of two elections, 1977 and 1981, in which to
test for microcontagion.
There are 19 electoraldistricts in Norway,one for each county. Each electoral
district elects severalmembersof parliament,rangingfrom 4 to 15. In the Canadian case the dependentvariablewas simply whetherthe Liberalparty candidate
was a woman;more formallyit was the proportionof the party districtdelegation
that was female. Developing a Norwegianequivalentto this is possible, but requiressome explanation.The totalnumberof nameson a parliamentarylist farexceeds the numberof seatsin the district,as the partylists also includealternates.In
the city of Oslo, for example,there are 15 MPs. The Labourparty won seven of
these seatsin 1977.The Labourpartylist for Oslo, however,had21 names!Clearly
most of those people knew they had no chanceof servingin the parliament.There
werejust as manynameson the lists for the otherpartieseven thoughmanyhad no
hope of representationor could only hope to get one representative.
Under these conditionsa party could profess to have equal representation,but
place men in all the top of the list positions and place women in the bottom of the
list positions.The list might be close to 50%women,but only men might be in positions that had a viablechanceof getting elected.Therefore,it is importantto distinguish between three differentlist positions:mandate,fighting, and ornamental
(Haavio-Mannilaet al. 1985).Mandatepositionsarethose that the partyis guaranteed to win; they are positions that the party has consistentlyheld and short of a
catastrophicelection result will maintain.Since voterscannotalterthe orderingof
candidateson the partylist, a personnominatedfor a mandatespot is as good as in
the parliamentimmediatelyafter the party nominatingmeetings. Fighting positions arethose positionswherethe outcomeis uncertain,but wherethe partyhas a
chanceto win the seat. These include seatsa party has held, but might lose if they
havea poor electoralcampaign,or seats that the party has not held, but might win
if they run a strong campaign.Finally,ornamentalpositions are exactlythat; they
arepeople who haveno chanceof being elected, but by placingthem on the list the
party hopes to attractsupportersfrom the variouscauses its list membersrepresent. Skardand Haavio-Mannila(1985) found that during the 1970s women were
disproportionatelyrepresentedamong those ornamentalpositions that had no
chanceof getting elected.To avoidthe dangerof countingwomenwho arein ornamentalpositions,the dependentvariabledevelopedis the femaleproportionof the
nomineesfor winnableseats, i.e., those seats that were either mandateor fighting
positions for the party.10
'0Weanalyzedeach county'svoting resultsto determinewhich list positionswere mandate,fighting,
or ornamental.Mandateseats were determinedby subtracting10%of the Labourparty'svote or 3.5%
of the total votes for the district,whicheverwas larger,from Labour'svote. We held the other parties'
votes constantand then calculatedhow manyseats Labourwould haveretainedunderthese hypothetical results (seats in Norway are allocatedusing the St. Lague method of allocation).The individual
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While the dependentvariablein the Canadiancase is dichotomous,the dependent variablein the Norwegiancase shows a wide dispersionfrom zero to 50% of
the nominees for winnableseats being female. Therefore, we use standardOLS
regression.
For symmetry with the Canadiancase, we use county-level women's labour
forceparticipationratesand the percentof the county populationhavinghad gymnas (secondaryschool-second level) or more education (university). As in the
Canadiancasethese variablesarestronglycorrelatedwith urbanizationand as such
provide a control for urbanization.In the Canadiancase, candidateincumbency
negativelyaffects the probabilitythat a woman will get nominatedbecause there
are no availableseats. In the Norwegiancase the same logic applies,but becausea
partymaywin severalseats,the importantthing is not whethera candidateis an incumbent,or how many of the party'scandidatesare incumbents,but ratherhow
many winnableseats are open for new party candidates.We estimated this open
seat variableby taking the number of winnableseats, i.e., the mandateplus the
fighting seats, and subtractingthe numberof incumbentsrunning.This provides
an estimateof how manyopen seatsareavailablewherethereis a realisticchanceof
the party'snew candidatesbeing elected to the parliament.This open seat variable
also providesa controlfor partymagnitude,the numberof seatsa party expects to
win in a district. Earlierwork on Norway (Matland1993) shows that the proportion of a party'scounty delegationthatis femaleis directlyrelatedto the size of the
delegation.Not surprisinglythere is a strong relationshipbetween the numberof
open seatsavailableand the total numberof seats held by the party."
The contagionvariablemeasureswhetherthe Liberalsor the SocialistLeft had
nominateda woman in a prominentposition on their lists. A prominentposition is
defined as either being a party'snumberone candidateor being nominatedfor a
winnableseat.It is 0 if neitherpartynominateda womanfor such a position, 1 if either partynominateda womanfor such a position,and 2 if both partiesnominated
a womanfor such a position. The numberone candidatehas a crucialposition as
the point person for the party within the district. Even when the party does not
have a good chanceof winninga seat, the numberone candidatereceivessubstantial mass mediaattentionand is quite visible. In those districtswhere the Liberals
district votes are publishedin the officialelection statistics handbook(NorwegianCentralBureauof
Statistics 1978,1982).Seats that the party was still certain of winning were mandateseats. All seats
which a party had won, but would have lost had the poorerresults actuallyoccurred,becamefighting
seats. Seats the party had won at the previous election, but lost in this election, were also fighting
seats.The second analysiswas to test if improvedresults might have enabled Labour to garnerseats
aboveand beyondwhat they had actuallywon. To Labour'sinitial vote total we added 10%of Labour's
vote or 3.5% of the entire district'svote, whicheverwas larger.The other party'svotes were held constant. Then the new hypotheticalresults were evaluatedto see if Labourwould have been able to win
additionalseats. Where this was true, the seat was identifiedas a fighting seat. All seats which Labour
would not have won even with the hypotheticalimprovementsin their vote total were identifiedas ornamentalseats.
" For 1977 the correlationbetween party magnitudeand numberof open seats is .42. For 1981 the
correlationis .74.
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TABLE3
RESULTSFORNORWAY,1977AND 1981
REGRESSION

Year

Constant

Women's
LaborForce
Part.Rate

1977

3.39
(4.10)
79.46
(49.54)

.79
(.83)
-.93
(1.04)

1981

Education
-.98*
(.50)
-.13
(.68)

Open
Seats
5.95**
(2.42)
7.67*
(3.91)

Soc. Left &
LiberalsNumberof
ProminentCandidates
8.69*
(4.49)
-5.12
(5.92)

Dependent Variable= FemaleProportionof LaborPartyCandidatesfor WinnableSeats
1981: N= 19
1977: N= 19.
R-squared = .55

AdjustedR-squared= .43
StandardError= .105
* Significantat the .05 level, one-tailedtest.
** Significantat the .01 level, one-tailedtest.

R-squared = .31

AdjustedR-squared= .12
StandardError= .135

or the Socialist Left nominateda woman as the numberone candidate,or for a
winnableseat, it would create substantialpressureon the Labourparty to nominatewomenin winnablepositions.Since eachpartyuses a nominatingcommission
that announcesits proposalfor the party lists well beforeparty nominatingmeetings are held, it is highly likely that the Labourparty would know of the Liberals
and SocialistLeft's intentionto nominatea womanin a prominentposition before
they finalizedtheir party list. The test of contagiontheory is whetherthe prominent candidatevariablehas a positive and statisticallysignificanteffect on the proportionof winnableseatsoccupiedby Labourwomen.
Table3 presentsthe regressionresults for 1977and 1981. The controlvariables
generallyshow the expected results. The open seat variablehas a very strong and
powerfuleffect in both years.This should hardlybe surprising,as incumbencyhas
been shown to be an impedimentto increasedfemalerepresentationin manycountries (Darcy,Welch, and Clark 1994). This variableshows that as the numberof
availableseats increases,the proportionof women amongthe viablenomineesalso
increasesdramatically.Women'slaborforce participationhad, as expected,a positive effect on women'sproportionof the Labourcandidatesfor winnableseats in
1977, but was negative in 1981; in neither year was the effect significant.Surprisingly,educationhas a negativeeffectin both years,and a statisticallysignificant
one in 1977.We are uncertainwhy this effect appears.
Contagionhas the predictedeffect in 1977. Labourparty lists have proportionately more women nominatedin winnablepositions in those districts where the
Liberalsor the SocialistLeft nominateda womanin prominentpositions.The effect is also substantivelysignificant,with Labourtending to nominate8.7% more
women in districts where one of the two innovatorsnominated a woman in a
prominentposition and fully 17.4% more in those constituencieswhere both the
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SocialistLeft and the Liberalsnominatedwomen.'2This is exactlywhatmicrocontagion would predict and providesconfirmationthat microcontagionoccurredin
Norwayduringthe 1977elections. This effect cannotbe explainedas macrocontagion or an indicationof changingsocial values. Those effects should be evident
across all counties. What these results show is that it is exactly in those counties
where the Socialist Left and the Liberals promoted women, that there was the
highest proportionof womenin winnablepositionson Labour'slists.
The 1981 results, on the other hand, show that microcontagionno longer appears to be occurring.The effect of the Socialist Left and Liberalsnominating
women in prominentpositions is negative, but nonsignificant.These results are
surprising,as microcontagionhad operatedas predictedin 1977.Upon furtherinspection, however,we found that the 1981 results are very fragile.If one extreme
case is removed, the effect changes from being negative to positive, albeit nonsignificant.'3In addition, carefulinspectionof the individualdatapoints suggests
that the Labourparty was alreadywell on its way to establishinggender quotas.
Although they did not formallyestablishquotas until the 1983 nationalconvention, it appearsthat alreadyin 1981Labourfelt a need to increasetheir promotion
of women, everywhere, regardlessof whether the Socialist Left or Liberalshad
womenrunningin prominentpositions.The proportionof womenin winnablepositions on Labourparty slates went up in nine counties, stayedthe same in eight
counties,and went down in only two counties.14 Comparisonsof the 1981lists with
the 1977 lists show that in seven of the eight districts where more than one new
name appearsamong the Labourcandidatesfor mandateand fightingpositions, a
womanwas addedto the list.' Of the 29 persons,in mandateor fightingpositions,
who were replacedon the Labourparty'slists from 1977to 1981, only five of them
(17%) were women. Of the 29 who were new in either mandateor fighting positions for the Labourparty,fully 14 (48%) of them were women. Althoughmicrocontagioneffects do not show up in the 1981regression,thereare individualcounties where microcontagionappearsto occur. In Nordland,for example,where the
Socialist Left elected a womanas their one representativein 1977, the three new
names in mandateor fighting positions for the Labourparty were all women (increasing women'sproportionof mandateand fighting nominationsin Nordland
1977were women,these arequite markedeffects.
"The one case is the county of Vest-Agder,where both the Liberalsand Socialist Left nominated
women,but whereneitherof the two Labourmandateor fightingpositionswere women.
'4The only reasonthe proportionwent down in two counties is a mathematicalflukecausedby the
Labourpartydoing substantiallyworsein those two countiesthanthey had in the 1977election. In both
counties womenwere runningfor a positionthat was a fightingpositionin 1977,but an ornamentalone
in 1981. While women were 2 of 5 winnablepositions in Akershusin 1977, they were 1 of 4 winnable
positions in 1981. The women'sproportionthereforedecreasedfrom 40% to 25%. It is importantto
note, however,that a womanwas in the fifth positionon the Akershuslist. If the Labourpartyhad done
as well in 1981as they did in 1977in Akershusand Rogaland,the proportionof womenin winnablepositions would have been the same and nowhere in the country would there have been a decreasein
women'srepresentationon Labour'slists.
'5Vest-Agder is againthe exception.
I2Consideringthatonly 24% of the MPs elected in
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from 14% to 50%). What we find when we look at the raw data is that Labour
women were making significant advances in representationin virtually every
county,not just in those districtswherethe SocialistLeft and Liberalshad prominent candidates.Microcontagiondoes not have a statisticallysignificanteffect in
1981,becauseLabourwas alreadyfeelingstrongmacrocontagionpressure,and was
reactingto that pressurein all counties.
CONCLUSION

At the outset we noted that there exists a growinggap between single member
and multimemberdistrict systems in the female proportionof legislatures.After
reviewingthe literature,we proposedcontagiontheory as a possible explanation
for the existing differences.After distinguishingbetweenmacro-and microcontagion, we turnedto testing for these types of contagionin two countries.While evidence for macrocontagioncould be found in both countries,we found sharpdifferences in the existenceof microcontagion.In choosingCanadaas the representative
for single-memberdistrictsystems,we purposelychose a countrywherethe probability of findingmicrocontagionwas strong.Yet the Canadiandatashow no indication of any microcontagionprocess.
The Norwegiancase, on the otherhand,providedsupportfor the argumentthat
innovativepolicies establishedby fringe parties can affect the traditionalparties,
not only generally,but in specific contests. Within the Norwegiancontext this is
especially importantas it establishesthe effect of the Liberal and Socialist Left
quota policies on femalerepresentation.The direct effect of the Liberalsand the
SocialistLeft establishingquotaswas virtuallyzero. In the 1977electionsthese two
partiesonly elected four representatives,one of whom was a woman.In 1981their
totalrepresentationincreasedfrom fourto six, only two werewomen.The indirect
effect of pressuringLabour,however,was substantiallylarger.From 1973 to 1977
the numberof women in Labour'sparliamentarydelegationincreasedfrom 12 to
20 and this totalagainincreasedin 1981to 22, despiteLabourlosing 10 seatsin the
1981election.
At a theoreticallevel, microcontagiontheoryprovidesa reasonableand now empiricallysupported,explanationfor why we find consistentdifferencesacrosselectoral systems in the level of femalerepresentation.It providesan explanationfor
why there has been a consistentgap betweensingle-memberdistrictand party list
proportionalrepresentationsystems, and why representationhas increasedmuch
more swiftly in proportionalrepresentationsystems.
While the emphasishere has not been on party changeper se, we believe some
tentativeclaimsaboutparty changecan be made basedon these results. First, the
environmentstrongly influencesparties (Harmel and Janda 1982). More specifically,the electoralsystemstructuredistinctivelyinfluencespartybehavior.Second,
parties are conservativeorganizationsthat are not easily moved to change their
policies. In the Canadiancase where, becauseof the single-memberdistrict election structure,therewas a high cost of respondingto pressuresfor equalrepresen-
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tation, there was no evidence of a microcontagioneffect. Third, partiescan adapt
when either the costs of change are limited or the apparentpayoffsare clear. In
party list proportionalrepresentationsystems, such as Norway,there are lower
costs of changing,and the expected payoffsare more certain.Under these conditions we do find partiesadaptingand the predictedmicrocontagioneffects appear.
The differencesin the two countriesare very much tied to the electoralsystems.
Becauseof this crucialdifference,it is likely that party list proportionalrepresentation systems will show more rapid increasesin representationof women than
single-memberdistrict systems. The Norwegiancase also seems to suggest that
thereis some interaction,with effectivemicrocontagionhavingthe effect of speeding alongmacrocontagioneffects.
These results provide a plausibleexplanationfor variationsin representation.
Nevertheless, the contagionhypothesis is far from completely developed or, for
that matter,conclusivelydemonstrated.While the Canadianresults were as predicted and the Norwegianresultslargelyas expected(with a plausibleexplanation
for the one important nonfinding), these results represent only two countries.
Contagionneeds testing in additionalcountriesand at differentlevels. This article
has emphasizedthe possibility of microcontagionexplainingdifferencesbetween
single-memberdistrict and proportionalrepresentationsystems. It may also be
true that contagion can help explain differencesin representationlevels across
countriesthat all have proportionalrepresentationsystems. Contagiontheory is a
processtheorythat describeshow actions can develop (Mohr 1983).The developments describedby the theory,however,are not guaranteedto occur. If no party
activelypromoteswomen'srepresentation,therewould be no innovationto be diffused acrossthe other parties. It might be that those countrieswith proportional
representationsystems that are leadersin femalerepresentationhave experienced
contagionwhile those countrieswith PR systemswhich lag behindarethose where
no contagionhas occurred.
Furtherresearchshould look at what institutionaland environmentalfactorsare
conduciveto both macro-and microcontagion.One importantfactorthat will fluctuateand mayaffectcontagion'seffectivenessis the strengthand level of resources
of women'sgroups within the majorparty being influencedby the fringe party.
Contagionfrom fringe to mainstreampartiesis more likely to be successfulon the
Left. This is becausemajorparties on the Left may feel a need to be sensitive to
groupstraditionallyexcludedfrom the circlesof power,but alsobecausethese parties often have strong internalwomen'smovementsthat can seize the opportunity
and use the fringeparty'spromotionof womento promotetheir policy aimswithin
their party. The more powerful these internal women's groups initially are, the
more likely contagionwill succeed. Certainlyin the Norwegiancase, the strength
of the women'smovementwithin the Labourparty is an importantpartof the explanationfor why contagionoccurredso quicklyin Norway.
Anotherfactorthat needs to be investigatedis whethermicrocontagiondepends
more on party magnitude,i.e., the numberof seats the party expects to win, or on
the nominatingsystem.It seems likelyin proportionalrepresentationsystemswith
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low districtmagnitudes,for exampleIrelandor Iceland,that a party trying to decide how to react to the promotionof greaterfemale representationfrom a competitor,might face a dilemmasimilarto the one facedby partiesin single-member
districts.The internalpartydynamicsmaybe such that if the partyrespondsto the
challenge by nominating more women, it must necessarilyshut out traditional
party intereststhat are used to havingaccess. Under these conditions it seems at
least plausiblethat microcontagion'seffect would be attenuatedeven in a proportional representationsystem.
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